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Power differences are observed in children’s early relationships, yet little is known about how children con-
ceptualize social power. Study 1 recruited adults (n = 35) to assess the validity of a series of vignettes to mea-
sure five dimensions of social power. Using these vignettes, Study 2 (149 three- to nine-year-olds, 42 adults)
and Study 3 (86 three- to nine-year-olds, 22 adults) showed that children visiting a science museum at a mid-
dle class university town are sensitive to several dimensions of social power from a young age; however, an
adult-like breadth of power concepts does not develop until 7–9 years. Children understand social power
whether the powerful character is malevolent or benevolent, though malevolent power is easier to detect for
children and adults.
Children are born into systems of social relation-
ships characterized by power. Power dynamics
shape relationships within the family, among peers,
and in school contexts. Power also characterizes
dynamics between and within social groups,
including those based on gender, race, and social
status (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)—concepts that chil-
dren develop and use from an early age. The ubiq-
uity of power in social relationships, at both the
individual and the group levels, implies that devel-
oping an understanding of social power is crucial
for children to successfully navigate the social
world. From an evolutionary standpoint, an early-
emerging concept of social power is adaptive and
needed for social competence in recognizing rela-
tional dynamics, gaining understanding of cultur-
ally appropriate behaviors, predicting others’
behaviors, and knowing which social alliances will
be beneficial. Despite extensive ethological research
in nonhuman animals’ power structures (for a
review, see De Waal, 2007), and human adults’ sen-
sitivity to social power (for a review, see Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999), surprisingly little is known about
the developmental origins of a concept of social
power, its predictors, and its consequences. The
goal of the present research is to investigate these
issues by examining children’s understanding of
social power differentials as manifested in social
interactions.
Origins of Conceptualizing Social Power
An individual’s social world is vast, complex,
and dynamic. The primate brain has evolved to
support the mapping of a dynamic social world,
including the tracking of grooming networks, kin-
ship relations, coalitions, transitive and third-party
relations, and quality of relationships with allies
and enemies (for a review, see Silk, 2007). The
adaptive advantage of such social mappings is to
maximize access to limited resources, and thus aid
survival (Hawley, 1999; Silk, 2007). Across species,
recognizing social power differentials allows indi-
viduals to build alliances with powerful others,
increasing cooperation and in turn, dominance,
leading to superior reproductive success (Cosmides
& Tooby, 1992; De Waal, 2007).
The few recent studies that examine the devel-
opment of social power concepts suggest that
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humans may have an early-developing cognitive
capacity to recognize power differentials. Thomsen,
Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, and Carey (2011) pre-
sented 8- to 13-month-old infants an animated
scene in which two agentic blocks differing in size
were depicted as having conflicting goals (i.e.,
moving in opposite directions along a path with
no room to pass one another). In the expected out-
come condition of the study, the smaller block
bent over and moved aside to allow the larger
block to continue on its path and achieve its goal,
whereas in the unexpected outcome condition, the
larger block bent over and moved aside to allow
the smaller block to continue on its path and
achieve its goal. Thomsen et al. (2011) found that
10- to 13-month-olds, but not 8-month-olds, looked
longer in the unexpected outcome condition, indi-
cating that their expectation of the outcome was
violated. The authors interpreted this finding as
indicating infants’ early capacity to represent social
dominance, meaning greater social power, and to
expect it to correlate with an agent’s size. Brey
and Shutts (2015) found that 5- to 6-year-olds, but
not 3- to 4-year-olds, showed adult-like sensitivity
to a range of nonverbal cues to social power (e.g.,
upright posture, raised gaze) when asked to indi-
cate who is in charge. Finally, in a study by
Charafeddine et al. (2014), French 3- to 5-year-olds
were presented with two puppets engaged in a
physical fight over two episodes, with the same
puppet winning on both instances. When asked
“Who is the boss?/C’est qui le chef?,” participants
selected the puppet that prevailed.
The findings reviewed above indicate children’s
early sensitivity to nonverbal cues to social power,
consistent with extensive research with adults
across cultures (Schubert, Waldzus, & Seibt, 2008)
as well as nonhuman primates (for reviews, see
Hall, Coats, & LeBeau, 2005; Schubert et al., 2008).
However, the tasks that have been used may only
require implicit processing of perceptual cues or
attention to inherent physical features, as opposed
to more explicit and reflective reasoning about how
two individuals relate to each other. Indeed, neuro-
scientific evidence with adults suggests that detec-
tion of nonverbal facial cues to dominance occurs
very rapidly—within 200 ms (Chiao et al., 2008),
indicating automatic processing. Several researchers
have argued for dual representational systems in
conceptual development, where different levels of
understanding are attributed to children in infancy
and in later childhood (e.g., Mandler, 1988; Well-
man & Gelman, 1992). Thus, an important question
is whether and when young children have access to
concepts of social power relationships that entail
more explicit and inferential reasoning.
Five Dimensions of Power
To examine children’s concepts of social power,
we selected five possible manifestations of power
that are prevalent in the social power literature.
Even though the dimensions were selected to repre-
sent distinct facets of social power, we use these
dimensions as a set of provisional conceptual dis-
tinctions to explore the breadth of children’s under-
standing of social power rather than an exhaustive
model of social power. These dimensions are all
construed as parts of a broader concept of social
power. Thus, there are inevitable conceptual over-
laps between the selected dimensions. Below, we
briefly describe the five dimensions of power that
are the focus of the present experiments: resource
control, goal achievement, permission, giving
orders, and setting norms.
Resource Control
Studies of children’s peer relationships show that
resource control is a common way in which 3- to 6-
year-old children exert dominance over their peers
(e.g., Hawley, 2002). One’s access to or control over
resources is central to the way in which social power
has been construed from an evolutionary perspective
(Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Hawley, 1999). From this
point of view, individuals who seek allegiances with
those who can access and control resources have bet-
ter chances of survival. Young children have strong
and consistent beliefs about the right ways of allocat-
ing resources. By 18–24 months of age children read-
ily share resources (Brownell, Iesue, Nichols, &
Svetlova, 2013), and 3- to 5-year-olds prefer equal dis-
tribution of resources (e.g., LoBue, Nishida, Chiong,
DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008). At
the same time, 3- to 6-year-old children display self-
interested biases, where they tend to share fairly only
if there is no cost to themselves (Smith, Blake, & Har-
ris, 2013). Starting at 4 years of age, there is rich evi-
dence for children’s early awareness of the value of
resources demonstrated through children’s beliefs
about ownership and property rights (e.g., Neary,
Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009; Noles & Gelman, 2014;
Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012). Of greatest relevance to the
current discussion, 4- to 5-year-olds show preference
for those who have more resources, even in the
absence of any indication that they themselves will
benefit from these resources (Li et al., 2014)—thereby
showing a capacity to track resource control. This
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behavior suggests that children may infer social
power relationships by observing the way in which
resources are handled between interacting individu-
als. In support of this hypothesis, Pietraszewski and
Shaw (2015) have shown that 6- to 8-year-olds use re-
source holding potential as a basis for deciding on out-
comes of conflicts over resources, expecting the
owner of the resource to win the conflict.
Goal Achievement
One way in which social power might be mani-
fested is through an individual’s or group’s ability
to achieve their intended goals at the expense of
others (Fiske, 1993; Guinote & Vescio, 2010; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Russell, 1938/2004).
Studies of social dominance patterns in children’s
peer relationships in preschool and elementary
school show that children who are rated by adults
as more powerful tend to be more socially compe-
tent and are more likely to manipulate peers to
achieve their own goals (Hawley, 2002, 2003). Pre-
vious research shows that children have an early
understanding of goal-directed and intentional
action, grounded in a developing theory of mind
(ToM; for a review, see Wellman, 2014). Young chil-
dren even accurately represent conflicting goals, as
long as their own goals are not compromised: when
3-year-olds are asked about two other individuals’
conflicting goals, they accurately identify the happy
and sad targets based on whose desires were ful-
filled in the end (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello,
2007; but also see Wright Cassidy et al., 2005).
However, although young children understand the
emotional consequences of conflicting or unac-
hieved goals, it is unclear whether young children
who understand that two individuals’ conflicting
goals will lead to negative feelings in the one
whose goals are not fulfilled will also understand
that this asymmetry in the ability to achieve goals
reflects power differentials.
Permission
Another important facet of social power is the
ability to control others’ outcomes (Fiske, 1993;
Keltner et al., 2003). Granting and denying permis-
sion are two important means by which such con-
trol takes place. Thus, understanding social power
relationships manifested in this way may necessi-
tate deontic-reasoning capacities in children; that is,
the understanding of social rules governing obliga-
tions, permissions, and prohibitions (Dack & Ast-
ington, 2011). Evolutionary theorists argue that
deontic reasoning is an innate adaptation that
allows one to detect those who violate social con-
tracts (Cosmides & Tooby, 2008) and to detect and
navigate social power hierarchies (Cummins,
1996a). Therefore, children should benefit from an
early-emerging understanding of permission in
social relationships.
Young children experience power manifested
through permission early on, as they are often told
what to do by parents and teachers and require
their permission for a number of daily activities.
Children as young as 3 years of age understand
social obligations and permissions (Cummins,
1996b; Dack & Astington, 2011; Wellman & Miller,
2008), and make inferences about a person based
on whether they give or deny permission (Neary
et al., 2009). Four- and 5-year-old children use
shared deontic properties (e.g., being allowed to
feed pigs) to make attributions of social category
membership between two individuals (Kalish &
Lawson, 2008). Given children’s early understand-
ing of deontic relations, which is a crucial under-
standing for representing social power
relationships, it was expected that children from a
young age will represent social power in terms of
permission.
Giving Orders
A leader’s ability to give others orders to divide
labor is another prevalent form of social power.
Although nonhuman primates may display some
form of division of labor (e.g., recruiting partners to
collaborate for a mutual goal, Melis, Hare, & Toma-
sello, 2006), the capacity to give verbal orders to eli-
cit leadership and followers is uniquely human (for
a review, see King, Johnson, & Van Vugt, 2009).
This sort of leadership behavior is prevalent in chil-
dren’s early peer relationships. When elementary
school children are asked to evaluate their peers,
leadership, popularity, and social dominance are
found to go hand in hand (for a review, see Rubin,
Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). Preschoolers and 7- to
11-year-olds follow orders of both peers and adults
when they are presented as authority figures (Kim,
1998; Laupa, 1994). Although young children expe-
rience leadership and are sensitive to its implica-
tions, it is unclear if they construe giving orders as
a manifestation of power.
Setting Norms
Because of their implications for shared inten-
tionality, social norms are considered to be unique
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to humans and a relatively recent adaptation
(Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013). Norms stress the evo-
lutionary pressures to be similar to others in your
group, leading to the enhancement of within-
group similarities and intergroup differences
(Tomasello, 2009). Social norms can be explicitly
stated (e.g., a powerful child announcing the rules
to a game) or implicitly manifested (e.g., others
imitating a powerful child’s appearance or behav-
iors). As powerful individuals are most likely to
be imitated, admired, and sought as allies by
others (Hawley, 1999), it is important to include
this facet of power in an examination of children’s
concepts.
Developmental evidence supports the impor-
tance of imitation in individual and group rela-
tions. Starting from 14 months of age, children
attend to models’ former success and expertise
when deciding whom to imitate (Koenig & Harris,
2005; Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008;
Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010).
Three- to 5-year-old preschoolers also prefer to
learn a new action from a prestigious adult model
to which others had previously attended than
from an adult model that others had previously
ignored (Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012;
McGuigan, 2013; for similar work with adults, see
Atkisson, O’Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012), and those
who have been labeled as smart rather than not
smart (Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 2013). Five-
year-olds use imitative behavior patterns to infer
affiliation and relative status in third-party rela-
tionships (Over & Carpenter, 2015). Furthermore,
5-year-olds primed with videos showing an indi-
vidual excluded from a group showed greater imi-
tation of an in-group model compared to children
in a control condition (Over & Carpenter, 2009).
Together, these findings suggest that children may
be sensitive to imitation in third-party relations,
and able to use these relationships to infer domi-
nance and group norms.
Social Power and Valence
Historically, social psychological perspectives on
the purpose of power have been divided into domi-
nance perspectives and functionalist perspectives
(Overbeck, 2010). In this dichotomy, dominance
perspectives define power structures as expressed
through violence and based on oppression, discrim-
ination, and the exploitation of people for a power-
ful person’s or elite group’s own benefits (Depret &
Fiske, 1993; Russell, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Examples are frequent in human history (e.g.,
genocide, racism). In contrast, functionalist perspec-
tives suggest that, due to the interdependence of
individuals in a society, power inheres in one or a
few individuals who then can carry out the inter-
ests of the larger group (Russell, 2004). Power rela-
tionships are viewed as necessary and beneficial,
and the person in power works for others’ best
interests. Thus, although the dominance view
defines power as corrupt and vicious, the function-
alist view defines it as an organizational factor that
benefits the group.
As previously described, a widely held perspec-
tive on conceptualizing social power is that, recog-
nizing power hierarchies provides adaptive
advantage for individuals in maximizing chances
of survival (e.g., Hawley, 1999; Silk, 2007). Evolu-
tionary forces enable individuals in both human
and nonhuman primate groups to readily recog-
nize power structures so that they can identify
potential alliances that will benefit them (e.g., Cos-
mides & Tooby, 1992). From this perspective, it
should also be important for individuals to easily
recognize both dominance and functionalist power
structures. Examples of both dominance (e.g., bul-
lying as a means of maintaining dominance) and
functionalist power (e.g., parents and teachers
exerting power for the advancement of children)
are commonplace in children’s everyday experi-
ences. To understand the breadth of children’s
conceptualization of social power, it is important
to examine their ability to identify those who are
in power both when they present as malevolent
and benevolent.
The Present Studies
The present experiments examine children’s
and adults’ concepts of social power relationships
between individuals, and advance our under-
standing of children’s concepts of social power in
three primary ways. First, we examined several
distinct respects in which power may be mani-
fested. Second, we included participants across a
wide age range (early preschool through elemen-
tary school and adults) in order to map out the
developmental trajectory of social power concepts.
Third, participants’ concepts of power were
assessed in situations where the powerful charac-
ter could be conceived as either malevolent or
benevolent in order to determine understanding
of both positive and negative manifestations of
power.
In Study 1, we first pretested our measures with
adult participants to ensure the validity of the five
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dimensions reviewed above: resource control, goal
achievement, permission, giving orders, and setting
norms. Using the vignettes pretested in Study 1,
Study 2 examined children’s (3- to 9-year-olds) and
adults’ concepts of social power by asking them to
identify the character who is “in charge,” in each of
the 10 vignettes. Finally, in Study 3, we tested chil-
dren’s and adults’ conceptualization of power when
the powerful character is benevolent (e.g., dis-
tributes resources equally), as a comparison to
Studies 1 and 2, in which the powerful characters
could be interpreted as relatively malevolent.
Together, the three studies provide a comprehen-
sive examination of children’s developing under-
standing of social power.
We had four key predictions. First, we expected
the capacity to reason about social power to emerge
early in development, given its hypothesized evolu-
tionary basis and significance for social functioning.
Second, we expected that as children’s social cogni-
tive abilities to represent mental states and social
relationships developed, their proficiency at using
different cues to social power would increase.
Third, we predicted different developmental trajec-
tories for the different dimensions. Specifically, the
first two dimensions (resource control and goal
achievement) were expected to develop earlier com-
pared to the last three (permission, giving orders,
and setting norms). Although resource control and
goal achievement situations can pertain exclusively
to individuals, and conceptualized as such, situa-
tions involving permission, giving orders, and set-
ting norms require dyadic interactions. Therefore,
power dynamics born from these concepts, due to
the very definition of social power, will be rela-
tional. Thus, we predict that children’s early under-
standing of resource control and goal achievement
might allow them to more easily represent social
power relationships that arise in these situations.
Additionally, resource control and goal achieve-
ment appear to be earlier adaptations that humans
share with nonhuman primates, as contrasted with
the last three dimensions, which require deontic
reasoning and advanced ToM capacities, that may
be later adaptations unique to human evolution
(Tomasello, 2009). Although evolutionary prece-
dence certainly does not necessitate ontological
precedence, the increased requirement of advanced
social cognitive skills might drive the same order in
development. Finally, because recognizing social
power relationships is believed to be an adaptive
function, we expected that children would represent
both malevolent and benevolent forms of power
early on.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants were 35 adults (M = 35.18 years; 13
females) recruited online through Amazon MTurk.
All adults resided in the United States, as deter-
mined by their IP addresses. All testing was done
online through the use of a survey designed on
Qualtrics. On the first page of the survey, partici-
pants received a consent form that they had to
agree to in order to continue onto the study. At the
end of the study, participants were given the option
to have their data deleted. However, no one
requested to do so. Participants received $0.50 for
their participation. Adults were not asked to pro-
vide additional demographic data.
Materials and Procedure
The survey consisted of 10 test vignettes
(Appendix S1). For each vignette, participants were
instructed to select any of the following descriptors
that they thought best described a predetermined
character in the story: controls resources, achieves
own goals, denies permission, sets norms, and
bosses around. They were free to select any number
of descriptors per vignette. These descriptors corre-
sponded to the dimensions that were being tested.
Vignettes were presented in randomized order for
each participant. The order in which the powerful
character was presented in each vignette was coun-
terbalanced across trials.
Results and Discussion
Results confirmed that the vignettes assessed the
five hypothesized dimensions. For each vignette,
the majority of participants selected the descriptor
consistent with the initially predicted dimension
(see means for all vignettes in Table 1). Because
participants were given a binary decision in which
they could select more than one dimension for each
vignette, each vignette was compared to chance (.5)
via a one-sample t test. These tests showed that
participants selected the predicted dimension as the
best descriptor significantly above-chance level for
every vignette. For 9 of the 10 vignettes, none of
the other dimensions were selected above chance.
The one exception was the “Ball” vignette (de-
signed to assess permission), for which participants
also selected a second descriptor (resource control)
significantly above chance.
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That participants selected the predicted dimen-
sions for all vignettes, and selected a second dimen-
sion only for one of the vignettes, validated the
vignettes by indicating that they depicted the five
dimensions of power that were intended to assess.
Study 2
Study 2 examined children’s and adults’ concep-
tions of who is in charge in situations depicting
power dynamics across the five dimensions of inter-
est. Using the vignettes tested in Study 1, we asked
participants to select the more powerful (“in
charge”) character in each of the 10 depicted situa-
tions, as well as for two control items (height and
an irrelevant dimension). Participants also provided
open-ended explanations for their selections, to
assess the reasoning behind their choices.
Method
Participants
Participants were fifty-five 3- to 4-year-olds
(M = 4.10, age range = 3.05–4.98, 28 females), fifty-
three 5- to 6-year-olds (M = 5.87, age range = 5.01–
6.95, 32 females), forty-four 7- to 9-year-olds
(M = 8.30, age range = 7.02–9.95, 30 females), and
42 adults (M = 28.59, age range = 18.14–39.61, 17
females). Child participants were recruited through
a local children’s museum in a predominantly mid-
dle-class university town in Midwestern U.S.A.
Adults were recruited online through MTurk,
recruitment procedures being identical to Study 1.
Participation was voluntary for both children and
adults. As compensation, children received a small
toy and adults received $0.50. Written parental con-
sent and child verbal assent were achieved for all
child participants prior to testing. Adult partici-
pants provided consent before participating. Data
were excluded from an additional eight children
who did not complete the study: four 3- to 4-year-
olds, two 5- to 6-year-olds, and two 7- to 9-year-
olds. Data were excluded from an additional 15
adults whose age exceeded the predetermined
range (18–40 years). (MTurk does not allow pre-
screening participants during recruitment.) Data for
Study 1 and following studies were collected
between July 2014 and June 2015.
Materials and Procedure
Children were tested individually by an experi-
menter using the questionnaire created on Qual-
trics. Adults participated individually through
MTurk, by accessing a Qualtrics link leading to the
adult version of the questionnaire. The only differ-
ences between the two questionnaires were the con-
sent and debrief procedures. Both questionnaires
included the same 10 vignettes that were tested in
Study 1. In each vignette, participants saw two
hand-drawn figures of the same shape and size,
wearing similar but distinct clothing patterns. Char-
acters within each vignette were also given similar
novel names (e.g., Twip and Kwip), to minimize
potential associations. Character gender matched
that of the participant, to control for possible preex-
isting assumptions about power and gender. Char-
acter appearances and names were pretested with a
Table 1
Adults’ Judgments of Vignette–Dimension Validity (Study 1)
Resource control (RC) Goal achievement (GA) Permission (P) Giving orders (GO) Setting norms (SN)
Toy truck (RC1) .77* [.13, .42] .66 [.01, .32] .4 [.27, .07] .31 [.35, .02] .06 [.52, .36]
Candy (RC2) .86* [.24, .48] .66 [.01, .32] .26 [.40, .09] .17 [.46, .20] .06 [.52, .36]
Bridge (GA1) .17 [.46, .20] .83* [.20, .46] .23 [.42, .13] .17 [.46, .20] .17 [.46, .20]
Dessert (GA2) .26 [.40, .90] .80* [.16, .44] .2 [.44, .16] .37 [.30, .04] .29 [.37, .06]
Ball (P1) .69* [.02, .35] .17 [.46, .20] .91* [.32, .51] .46 [.22, .13] .11 [.50, .27]
Castle (P2) .57 [.10, .24] .2 [.44, .16] .94* [.36, .52] .6 [.07, .27] .09 [.51, .32]
Blocks (GO1) .34 [.32, .01] .29 [.37, .06] 0 .91* [.32, .51] .23 [.42, .13]
Clean-up (GO2) .23 [.42, .13] .34 [.32, .01] .03 [.53, .41] .86* [.24, .48] .23 [.42, .13]
Red t-shirt (SN1) .11 [.50, .27] .31 [.35, .02] .06 [.52, .36] .4 [.27, .07] .94* [.36, .52]
Badge (SN2) .09 [.51, .32] .31 [.35, .02] 0 .57 [.10, .24] .97* [.41, .53]
Note. Numbers show participants’ mean proportion of endorsements [95% confidence interval] for each power dimension in each vign-
ette. In Study 1, adult participants were asked to select what they thought was the best descriptors (they were able to select multiple
responses) for the target character in each vignette. Mean responses were compared to chance (.5). Vignette–dimension pairings of inter-
est are shown in bold. Scores that were above chance are indicated (*p < .05).
Developing Concepts of Power 951
separate sample of 31 adults through MTurk to
make sure that adults did not have prior assump-
tions about the gender of the characters in the
images. With the exception of one permission vign-
ette and one resource control vignette, participants
judged the characters as having the same gender.
As an added measure, the assignment of characters
to power roles was counterbalanced across partici-
pants, with 112 participants receiving one assign-
ment (A) and 81 receiving the other assignment (B).
In order to control for possible order effects, the
position of the powerful character was counterbal-
anced across the two vignettes within each dimen-
sion, such that the powerful character was on the
left for one vignette, and on the right for the other
vignette.
Each experimental session began with instruc-
tions pointing out that the characters were the same
gender as the participant, and that they were all the
same age. After each vignette, participants were
asked, “Who is in charge? [Name of first character]
or [name of second character]?” The name of each
character was written underneath it. With child par-
ticipants, the experimenter also pointed at the rele-
vant character each time its name was mentioned
in the script, and pointing responses were permit-
ted. After each response, participants were also
asked to explain their selection: “How do you
know?”
The test vignettes were presented in randomized
order. After receiving all 10 test vignettes, partici-
pants were given two additional control vignettes,
in fixed order. In the irrelevant control, the two
characters differed on an irrelevant dimension (i.e.,
one drew a yellow house with an orange roof, the
other drew an orange house with a yellow roof),
and we expected participants to select at chance. In
the height control, two characters differed in height,
and we expected that participants would select the
taller character. This trial was always shown at the
very end. These control trials were exploratory and
are not included in the remainder of this article (see
Appendix S2 for a sample trial of the task).
Coding and Analysis
Participants received 1 point on each trial they
identified the character predicted to be more pow-
erful on the test trials, as well as 1 point for identi-
fying the taller figure on the height control trial; all
other responses received 0 points.
In addition to scoring participants’ performance
on individual vignettes, several composite scores
were calculated. First, composite scores for each
dimension of power were created by summing par-
ticipants’ scores for the two vignettes in each
dimension, yielding five separate dimension scores
for each participant (resource control, goal achieve-
ment, setting norms, permission, giving orders).
The maximum possible score for these individual
dimension composites was 2 (if a participant
selected the predicted character on both vignettes
within a dimension), with chance level at 1. Second,
a total composite score was calculated, which was
equal to the sum of all five composite dimension
scores. Thus, the maximum possible score for the
total composite was 10 (if a participant selected the
predicted character on every vignette), chance level
was 5, and the minimum possible score was 0 (if a
participant selected the opposite character on every
test trial).
For the open-ended questions that followed each
of the vignettes, each response was coded as either
“relevant dimension” or “other.” Responses were
coded as “relevant dimension” and received 1 point
if they identified the dimension that the power rela-
tionship was intended to depict, or identified the
main element of the story that made the character
more powerful. All other responses were coded as
“other” and received 0 points. Two experimenters
independently coded a randomly selected 20% of
the data (39 participants) to achieve coding reliabil-
ity. Because the content of the relevant dimension
codes varied across each of the five dimensions, the
coding reliability was calculated separately for each
dimension. Results for the coding reliability (agree-
ment, kappa) were as follows: resource control
(92%, .83), goal achievement (92%, .84), permission
(92%, .85), giving orders (82%, .63), and setting
norms (90%, .77). The two experimenters reconciled
discrepancies, and one of the experimenters com-
pleted the remaining coding. The relevant dimen-
sion codes were tallied to create the two-level
composites identical to those created for the forced-
choice responses: individual dimension scores (re-
source control, goal achievement, permission, giv-
ing orders, setting norms) and a total composite
score.
Results
Choices
First, to examine participants’ performance on
each of the dimensions of power, a repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance was carried out with
dimension (resource control, goal achievement, per-
mission, giving orders, setting norms) as the
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within-subjects variable, and age group (3- to 4-
year-olds, 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 9-year-olds,
adults) and assignment (assignment A, assignment
B) as between-subjects variables. Results are shown
in Figure 1. There was a significant main effect of
age group, F(3, 185) = 25.99, p < .001, g2p ¼ :30. Post
hoc pairwise comparisons showed that each age
group performed significantly better than all of the
preceding age groups (ps < .01). There was also a
significant main effect of assignment, F(1,
185) = 4.10, p = .04, g2p ¼ :02, with those receiving
assignment B (M = 1.62) showing a small but con-
sistent advantage compared to those receiving
assignment A (M = 1.51). The Age Group 9 Order
interaction was not significant, F(3, 185) = 0.76,
p = .52, g2p ¼ :01.
Importantly, there was a significant main effect
of dimension, F(4, 740) = 4.50, p = .001, g2p ¼ :02.
Post hoc Bonferroni comparisons showed that par-
ticipants performed better on permission vignettes
(M = 1.68) than on goal achievement (M = 1.50,
p = .01) and giving orders (M = 1.46, p = .005). Per-
formance on the other dimensions did not vary sig-
nificantly from each other. This effect was
subsumed under the significant Dimension 9 Age
Group interaction, F(12, 740) = 1.95, p = .03,
g2p ¼ :03. Post hoc comparisons showed that 7- to
9-year-old children and adults performed similarly
on all dimensions except for permission, where
adults (M = 1.98) performed better than 7- to 9-
year-olds (M = 1.65, p = .016). Adults performed
better than all other age groups (3- to 4-year-olds
and 5- to 6-year-olds) on all dimensions. Seven- to
9-year-olds performed better than 5- to 6-year-olds
on resource control (p = .04) and giving orders
(p < .001), and they performed better than 3- to 4-
year-olds on all dimensions but permission
(p = .17). Finally, 5- to 6-year-olds performed better
than 3- to 4-year-olds on goal achievement (p = .04)
and setting norms (p = .01). Any effects not
reported here were nonsignificant. These results
indicate the piecemeal fashion through which chil-
dren’s sensitivity to social power emerges across
development. As opposed to being a unitary con-
cept, sensitivity to different aspects of social power
seems to come online at different points of develop-
ment.
Next, to examine participants’ overall tendency
to infer power differences in the given vignettes,
each age group’s mean total composite score was
compared to chance (chance level = 5). Results
showed that the overall scores for all age groups
were significantly above chance (ps < .001). In addi-
tion to understanding participants’ relative sensitiv-
ity to social power across the dimensions, we
conducted a series of one-sample t tests comparing
each age group’s performance on each dimension
to chance (chance level = 1). Results indicated that
Figure 1. Study 2: Mean scores on each dimension for each age group in choice questions (“Who is in charge?”). Score for each dimen-
sion is a composite sum of the scores of the two relevant vignettes. Scores that are significantly above chance are indicated (*p < .05).
Developing Concepts of Power 953
all age groups scored above chance on resource
control (ps ≤ .001), goal achievement (ps ≤ .008),
and permission (ps < .001). Three- to 4-year-olds
scored at chance on giving orders and setting
norms, and 5- to 6-year-olds scored at chance on
giving orders. Seven- to 9-year-olds and adults
scored above chance on all dimensions. Thus, chil-
dren as young as 3–4 years of age show a clear
understanding of power differentials in the resource
control, goal achievement, and permission vignettes
that we presented. However sensitivity to power in
other dimensions appears to emerge later in devel-
opment (setting norms does not emerge until age 5,
and giving orders does not emerge until age 7).
Explanations
A similar analysis plan was followed up for par-
ticipants’ explanations in response to the follow-up
questions (“How do you know?”). Open-ended
responses were scored as 1 (dimension relevant) or 0
(other). A repeated measures analysis of variance
was conducted with dimension as the within-sub-
jects variable, and age group and assignment as the
between-subjects variables. Results were similar to
those found for the choices. There was a significant
main effect for age group, F(3, 185) = 39.09,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :39, indicating that all age groups
identified the relevant dimension significantly more
than the preceding age groups (ps < .003), except
that adults and 7- to 9-year-olds performed simi-
larly (p = .06). There was a main effect for dimen-
sion, F(4, 740) = 16.65, p < .001, g2p ¼ :08. Post hoc
comparisons showed that participants provided the
most dimension-relevant responses for resource
control, giving orders, and setting norms. Both of
these main effects were subsumed under the signifi-
cant Age Group 9 Dimension interaction, F(12,
740) = 3.86, p < .001, g2p ¼ :06. Post hoc compar-
isons showed that 3- to 4-year-olds provided the
most dimension-relevant responses for resource
control, which was significantly higher than all
other dimensions (ps < .02), and the least dimen-
sion-relevant responses for permission, which was
significantly lower than all other dimensions
(ps < .04). Further examination of 3- to 4-year-olds’
responses showed that 24% of their dimension non-
relevant responses on permission items pertained to
resource control, whereas 13% pertained to permis-
sion and 44% were irrelevant to the task. Five- to 6-
year-olds provided the most dimension-relevant
responses for resource control and setting norms,
both of which were higher than all other dimen-
sions (ps < .04). Similar to 3- to 4-year-olds, 5- to 6-
year-olds provided the least dimension-relevant
responses for the permission dimension, which was
significantly below all other dimensions (ps < .01).
Seven- to 9-year-olds performed highest on resource
control, giving orders, and setting norms (ps < .02),
and equally low on goal achievement and permis-
sion. Adults provided the most dimension-relevant
responses for permission, giving orders, and setting
norms (ps < .01), and the lowest dimension-relevant
responses for goal achievement (ps < .005). Finally,
there was a main effect for assignment, F(1,
185) = 4.15, p = .04, g2p ¼ :02, indicating a slight
advantage for those in assignment B (M = 1.35)
compared to those in assignment A (M = 1.19),
though assignment did not interact with age group
or dimension.
Discussion
In Study 2, 3- to 9-year-olds children and adults
were presented with vignettes that were confirmed
in Study 1 to map onto five hypothesized dimen-
sions of social power: resource control, goal
achievement, permission, giving orders, and setting
norms. Results showed that even the youngest par-
ticipants noticed social power differentials for the
resource control, goal achievement, and permission
dimensions. The findings also showed a clear devel-
opmental trajectory, such that children did not link
social power to setting norms until ages 5–6 (de-
spite that in these vignettes the norms were explic-
itly stated, which presumably should make them
more salient), nor to giving orders until ages 7–9.
These results are consistent with Mascaro and Csi-
bra’s (2012) and Thomsen et al.’s (2011) findings
showing that even preverbal infants may be sensi-
tive to power relationships in resource control and
goal achievement situations, and support our pre-
diction based on comparative studies with nonhu-
man primates (Tomasello, 2009) that social power
would be understood with regard to resource con-
trol and goal achievement sooner than with regard
to other dimensions requiring understanding deon-
tic relations. The results are also consistent with
Pietraszewski and Shaw’s (2015) findings of 6- to 8-
year-olds children’s sensitivity to resource owner-
ship in conflict situations. Surprisingly, however,
even the youngest children in this sample were also
sensitive to permission (also a deontic relation) in
their selections of the individual in charge. Because
3- and 4-year-olds provided the lowest number of
dimension-relevant responses for the permission
dimension, we further examined the types of expla-
nations children in this age group provided.
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Although the youngest children consistently inter-
preted permission denial as reflecting power differ-
ences, the dimension nonrelevant explanations they
provided suggest that they may have interpreted
those vignettes as indicating imbalances in resource
control rather than permission. A large portion of
children in this age group did not provide any
interpretable explanations. Youngest children’s con-
flation of resource control and permission makes
sense when the vignettes are considered: In both
permission vignettes, the character in charge is
denying the other character the use of a resource
(i.e., playing with a ball, going inside a castle).
Thus, although a majority of adults’ explanations of
these vignettes were about permission, for the
younger children, resource control may have been a
stronger cue to social power.
Together, these results show that preschool chil-
dren are aware of social power differentials
between individuals. Importantly, their understand-
ing of social power goes beyond recognizing impli-
cit, nonverbal cues to include more complex
manifestations, including the control of resources,
the achievement of desired goals at the expense of
others, and the capacity to deny permission. Over
development, children also begin to understand
more nuanced forms of social power that require
representation of social obligations and norms.
Study 3: Children’s Concepts of Benevolent
Power
Results of Study 2 indicate that children have
acquired a dominance perspective of power by ages
3–4 years, meaning that they easily represent
malevolent manifestations of power (e.g., not giving
permission, taking more candy). These findings
raise the question of whether children are sensitive
to more functionalist aspects of power, and whether
they are able to represent benevolent power as well
as malevolent power.
Prior research indicates that children are highly
sensitive to benevolent (prosocial, “nice”) and
malevolent (antisocial, “mean”) behavior from a
young age. Even infants show marked preferences
for prosocial individuals (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom,
2007, 2010), and preschool-age children make
friendship judgments based on nice versus mean
trait information. For example, 4- to 6-year-olds
(but not 3-year-olds) show strong friendship prefer-
ences for those who are smart, nice, and honest (as
opposed to not smart, mean, and dishonest; Lane
et al., 2013), 5- and 6-year-olds show friendship
preferences for those who speak with a foreign
accent but are nice, as opposed to those who speak
with a native accent but are mean (despite showing
strong preferences for native accented speakers
when all else is equal; Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013),
and preschoolers use traits like “nice” and “mean”
in making inferences about people (for a review,
see Heyman, 2009).
Although children’s sensitivity to benevolence
and malevolence is increasingly well documented,
how children’s judgments of benevolence and
malevolence fit into their concepts of social power
is less clear. One possible prediction is that children
may at first conflate malevolence with power, as
illustrated by an anecdote shared by the father of a
3-year-old participant in Study 2: His child had
recently declared that she knew which of her two
teachers was the one in charge (although in fact
they were equally in charge). When asked why, she
said that the meaner teacher was more in charge.
Participants in Study 2 occasionally made similar
comments in response to the vignettes. Thus, an
important question is whether and when children
can conceptualize power independent of meanness.
Study 3 was designed to examine children’s
understanding of social power when the powerful
character behaved in a benevolent manner. By
using a protocol similar to that used in Study 2 but
depicting benevolent powerful characters, Study 3
also provides an important control to test that what
is measured in Study 2 is indeed children’s infer-
ences about social power relations and not their
perceptions of meanness.
Method
Participants
Participants were thirty-two 3- to 4-year-olds
(M = 4.33, age range = 3.11–4.97 years, 20 females),
twenty-six 5- to 6-year-olds (M = 6.01, age
range = 5.03–6.90 years, 17 females), twenty-eight
7- to 9-year-olds (M = 8.10, age range = 7.15–
9.88 years, 16 females), and 22 adults (M = 26.71,
age range = = 18.19–36.78 years, 11 females).
Recruitment method was identical to Study 2. Data
from three additional children (2 aged 3–4, 1 aged
7–9) were dropped: one child participant was not
fluent in English, and two children said they did
not know what “in charge” meant. Data from nine
adults were dropped because their ages were not
within the predetermined age range of 18–40 years,
and because MTurk does not allow recruiting par-
ticipants of selected age groups.
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Materials and Procedure
The present study presented a modified version
of the protocol from Study 2 to measure children’s
and adults’ perceptions of benevolent power. A
subset of the dimensions used in Study 2 for which
all age groups showed sensitivity (resource control,
goal achievement, and permission) were selected in
order to ensure that our measure tapped into even
youngest children’s concepts of power. Vignettes of
these dimensions were modified to depict the more
powerful characters as having benevolent inten-
tions. For example, in Study 2, one permission
vignette (Ball) was, “Grup was playing with a ball.
Trup asked Grup, ‘Can I play too?’ Grup told Trup,
‘No, you cannot.’” In contrast, the wording of the
comparable vignette for this study was, “Grup was
playing with a ball. Trup asked Grup, ‘Can I play
too?’ Grup told Trup, ‘Yes, you can.’” Appendix S3
lists the scripts of these new vignettes. As in Study
2, participants were randomly assigned to one of
two orders of presentation.
To ensure that the original and modified vign-
ettes for the three dimensions differed from each
other in terms of malevolence–benevolence, we con-
ducted a pretest with 23 additional adults
(M = 28.75, range = 21–41 years) recruited through
MTurk, none of whom participated in the main
study. In this pretest, participants were given writ-
ten text (no pictures) of both the malevolent and
benevolent items in randomized order. Participants
were asked to rate the protagonist in each story on
a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (mean) to 5
(nice). Paired t tests of the composite scores for each
dimension (i.e., ranging from 2 [mean] to 10 [nice])
showed that the modified benevolent versions of all
three dimensions (resource control, M = 9.13; goal
achievement, M = 9.26; permission, M = 9.43) were
judged as significantly nicer than their original
malevolent versions (resource control, M = 4.39;
goal achievement, M = 6.04; permission, M = 2.74;
ps < .001).
The procedure of the main task was identical to
that of Study 2, with the exception of the open-
ended question following each vignette, which was
changed from “How do you know?” (Study 2) to
“Why is X in charge?” (Study 3). Participants did
not receive the control trials.
Coding
The scoring of the choice questions and the cod-
ing of the open-ended questions were identical to
Study 2.
Results
Choices
In order to examine participants’ sensitivity to
benevolent power in the three dimensions of social
power, a repeated measures analysis of variance
was carried out with dimension (three levels:
resource control, goal achievement, permission) as
the within-subjects variable, and age group (four
levels: 3- to 4 year-olds, 5- to 6 year-olds, 7- to 9-
year-olds, adults) as the between-subjects variable.
Preliminary analyses showed no significant order
effects, so order was not included as a variable in
subsequent analyses. There was a significant main
effect of age group, F(3, 101) = 7.89, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :19. Post hoc pairwise comparisons showed
that 3- to 4-year-olds (M = 1.18) performed signifi-
cantly worse than 7- to 9-year-olds (M = 1.54,
p = .002) and adults (M = 1.71, p < .001), and that
5- to 6-year-olds (M = 1.35) performed significantly
worse than adults (p = .004). There was also a sig-
nificant main effect of dimension, F(2, 202) = 23.31,
p < .001, g2p ¼ :19. Post hoc comparisons indicated
that performance on all three dimensions were sig-
nificantly different from each other (ps < .001), with
the lowest performance on goal achievement
(M = 1.16) and the highest performance on permis-
sion (M = 1.70). No other significant effects were
found in this analysis.
Participants’ dimension scores were also com-
pared to chance (3) with a series of one-sample t
tests conducted with each age group’s overall score.
Results showed that the overall score for each age
group was significantly above chance (ps < .04).
Each age group’s mean scores on each of the
dimensions were also compared to chance (1).
Although 3- to 4-year-olds were above chance only
on permission, t(31) = 3.46, p = .002, 5- to 6-year-
olds and 7- to 9-year-olds performed above chance
for resource control and permission (ps < .03).
Adults performed above chance on all three dimen-
sions (ps < .03). Figure 2 shows age groups’ mean
performances on each dimension.
Explanations
Using an analysis plan parallel to the one used
for the choice responses, we conducted a repeated
measures analysis of variance with dimension
(three levels: resource control, goal achievement,
permission) as the within-subjects variable, and age
group (four levels: 3- to 4 year-olds, 5- to 6 year-
olds, 7- to 9-year-olds, adults) as the between-sub-
jects variable. There was a significant main effect of
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age group, F(3, 101) = 17.15, p < .001, g2p ¼ :34. Post
hoc comparisons showed that 3- to 4-year-olds
(M = 0.33) performed significantly lower than all
other age groups, with adults (M = 1.51) providing
the most dimension-relevant responses, and 5- to 6-
year-olds (M = 1.12) and 7- to 9-year-olds
(M = 1.15) performing similarly to each other. There
were no other significant effects in this analysis.
Comparing Malevolent and Benevolent Power
To directly compare responses to the benevolent
power items in Study 3 with the corresponding
dimensions in Study 2, a repeated measures analy-
sis of variance was carried out with dimension (re-
source control, goal achievement, permission) as the
within-subjects variable, and age group and study
(Study 2, “malevolent”; Study 3, “benevolent”) as
the between-subjects variables (see Figure 3). Here,
we report only those significant effects involving
study, as all other factors are redundant with the
analyses already reported.
Results showed a significant main effect for
study, F(1, 292) = 9.02, p = .003, g2p ¼ :03. Overall,
participants performed significantly better when
judging malevolent than benevolent vignettes
(Ms = 1.60 and 1.44, respectively). Moreover, there
was a significant two-way interaction between
Dimension 9 Study, F(2, 584) = 8.46, p < .001,
g2p ¼ :03. Post hoc comparisons showed that
participants in the malevolent power study (Study
2) scored higher than participants in the benevolent
power study (Study 3) on resource control and goal
achievement, but not permission. There were no
interactions of Age Group 9 Study or Age
Group 9 Study 9 Dimension.
Discussion
Overall, these results indicate that children as
young as 3 and 4 years of age represent social
power relationships even when the powerful char-
acter is benevolent. Thus, Study 3 supports the
notion that children’s concepts of social power are
not limited to situations of malevolent dominance.
However, identifying social power relationships
in situations where the powerful character was
malevolent was easier than when the powerful
character was benevolent, both for children and
adults.
While even 3- and 4-year-olds’ total scores were
above chance, the three dimensions yielded differ-
ent developmental trajectories. For 3- and 4-year-
olds, although their overall scores did not differ sig-
nificantly from 5- to 6-year-olds’, the only dimen-
sion where sensitivity was observed was
permission. Indeed, children showed an early and
consistent understanding that giving permission
indicates power as strongly as denying permission.
By 5–6 years of age, children also showed
Figure 2. Study 3: Mean scores on each dimension for each age group in choice questions (“Who is in charge?”). Score for each dimen-
sion is a composite sum of the scores of the two relevant vignettes. Scores that are significantly above chance are indicated (*p < .05).
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sensitivity to resource control in selecting the pow-
erful character. However, only adults used goal
achievement in determining the powerful character.
It is interesting that children and adults were not
as sensitive to the resource control and goal
achievement dimensions when the character was
benevolent as when the character was malevolent.
These findings suggest that understanding malevo-
lent power is easier than understanding benevolent
power, even for adults. Children’s and adults’ ease
of recognizing malevolent power relative to benevo-
lent power might be explained through possible
evolutionary adaptations to easily recognize antiso-
cial others. Researchers have suggested that nega-
tive behaviors (e.g., meanness) are conceptually
privileged, as their early recognition in others may
be crucial for survival (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson,
1999). Such a negativity bias—where negative infor-
mation is attended to, utilized, and remembered to
a greater degree than positive information—is
found in young children as well as adults (e.g.,
Hamlin et al., 2010; Vaish, Grossmann, & Wood-
ward, 2008), and may help explain the differences
found across the two studies.
In addition to the adaptive advantage of recog-
nizing malevolent power early in development,
understanding benevolent power may require more
sophisticated cognitive skills than understanding
malevolent power. For example, ethological studies
of preschoolers and older children have shown that
dominant children’s successful use of a combination
of coercive and aggressive strategies (as opposed to
just aggressive strategies) for establishing and main-
taining social power among peers are predicted by
higher performance on ToM tasks (Pellegrini et al.,
2011).
One further point is that benevolent and malevo-
lent power differences are not simply inverses of
one another, but entail different processes and
mechanisms by which power is manifest. To illus-
trate, the goal achievement vignettes in Study 3,
though superficially the inverse of those in Study 2,
changed in their implications. In the benevolent
goal achievement vignettes, the more powerful
character is the one who yields to the other charac-
ter. Thus, the yielding character demonstrates
power by showing initiative and decision-making
capacity, but does not end up achieving his or her
intended goal. This is in contrast to the malevolent
goal achievement vignettes, in which the more
powerful character demonstrates power more by
brute force. Thus, children’s lack of sensitivity to
the goal achievement dimension may reflect this
change in meaning, and the increased subtlety in
the cues to power.
General Discussion
In three studies, we examined children’s and adults’
conceptualization of social power as an aspect of
interindividual relationships. Given the complexity
Figure 3. Comparison of mean scores on choice questions of Study 2 and Study 3. Significant pairwise differences are indicated
(*p < .05).
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and multidimensionality of social power, we stud-
ied the development of sensitivity to five possible
manifestations of social power: resource control,
goal achievement, permission, giving orders, and
setting norms. Across three studies, 3- to 9-year-
olds children and adults were asked to infer which
of two individuals had more power. Results
showed that even 3- to 4-year-olds were sensitive
to social power differences manifested through
resource control, goal achievement, and permission.
Understanding of setting norms emerged at 5–
6 years of age, whereas understanding of giving
orders emerged at 7–9 years. Thus, by ages 7–9,
children showed adult-like understanding of how
social power characterizes interpersonal relation-
ships in the five dimensions tested.
Moreover, children’s sensitivity to social power
was not limited to their understanding of power as
mean or malevolent. As Study 3 demonstrated, chil-
dren as young as 3–4 years of age extend their con-
cepts of social power relationships to permission
situations where the powerful individual gives per-
mission to the one who asks for it. Five- to 6-year-
olds also accurately attributed social power in
resource control vignettes where the powerful char-
acter shares a toy with the other individual, or
divides resources up evenly even though he or she
has access to all resources. Around 7–9 years of age,
children also represent deferring as a sign of power,
where the powerful individual in the goal achieve-
ment situations was identified as the one explicitly
yielding the right of way or decision making.
These results add to the existing body of
research with infants (Mascaro & Csibra, 2012,
2014; Thomsen et al., 2011) and preschoolers (Brey
& Shutts, 2015) showing early sensitivity to nonver-
bal cues to social power. In addition, although the
exact dimensions used differ, the results are consis-
tent with Charafeddine et al.’s (2014) findings that
3- to 5-year-old children are able to accurately iden-
tify the “boss” across scenarios depicting a physical
fight, a verbal argument, a wealth discrepancy, and
an age asymmetry.
These studies add to previous findings in several
important ways. First, they provide a broader
developmental scope through the inclusion of 3- to
9-year-old children and adults, and demonstrate the
piecemeal fashion in which a multidimensional con-
cept of social power develops. Although an under-
standing of social power as manifested through
resource control, goal achievement, and permission
was apparent early in development, sensitivity to
giving orders and setting norms emerged later in
development.
In addition, the early emergence of sensitivity to
resource control and goal achievement is consistent
with evolutionary theories of social power (for
reviews, see Cummins, 1996a; Hawley, 1999).
Because control over resources and achievement of
goals can be fundamental to species survival, it is
likely that these capacities are part of an adaptive
cognitive system that is tuned to recognize social
power hierarchies (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). In
contrast, understanding social power in situations
of permission, giving orders, and setting norms
requires the ability to represent social and moral
obligations and shared intentionality. For these rea-
sons, and the lack of examples of these behaviors in
nonhuman primate groups, it is believed that these
capacities are relatively recent adaptations in
human evolution (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Toma-
sello, 2009). However, the evolutionary account
may not be sufficient to explain the developmental
patterns in children’s power concepts. The types of
social interactions children experience are bound to
change with age. As children gain further experi-
ence with different social situations, the adaptive
benefit of recognizing social power might allow
children to map their concept of social power onto
the different social situations they come to experi-
ence.
One surprising result was that permission
emerged as an early-developing manifestation of
power for young children, despite the predictions
provided above. Children correctly identified who
was in charge both when the character denied
(Study 2) and gave (Study 3) permission to another
individual. One possible explanation is that the use
of resources (i.e., the castle, the ball) in the permis-
sion vignettes may have drawn participants’ atten-
tion to the resource control dimension. Because
participants are sensitive to resource control as a
manifestation of power early on, if they interpreted
the situation as permission over resources (as
opposed to permission to participate in an activity
including resources), they may have made power
judgments more easily. Alternatively, young chil-
dren might simply experience permission situations
frequently and early on, which might lead to
heightened sensitivity specifically to permission,
contrary to what we had predicted.
The second major contribution of the work
described here is demonstrating the breadth of chil-
dren’s understanding, by examining their concepts
of benevolent as well as malevolent social power.
Prior work examining children’s concepts of social
power relationships has focused on powerful char-
acters that could be interpreted as malevolent or
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neutral (neither wholly malevolent nor benevolent;
e.g., Charafeddine et al., 2014). Thus, in prior stud-
ies it was unclear whether children were respond-
ing to power differentials or the dominant
character’s meanness. For example, in one vignette,
two puppets engaged in a physical fight, where one
puppet consistently won. Three- to 5-year-olds
accurately identified the winner as the “boss”
(Charafeddine et al., 2014). In the present studies,
even in depictions of power that could be inter-
preted as malevolent, every effort was made to
avoid drawing children’s attention to aggression
rather than power. That children understood power
differentials even when the powerful characters
were benevolent provided an additional demonstra-
tion that the task assessed concepts of power.
Importantly, although children showed sensitiv-
ity to both malevolent and benevolent forms of
social power, comparing results of the malevolent
and benevolent power studies revealed that under-
standing malevolent power is easier than under-
standing benevolent power. The lack of age group
differences in these findings suggest that identifying
a powerful character is easier even for adults when
the character is depicted as malevolent than benev-
olent. Thus, both adults and children may conflate
power and malevolence to a degree, where identify-
ing power across some manifestations (i.e., resource
control, goal achievement) is perhaps more straight-
forward when the powerful character is mean and
selfish. Understanding benevolent power might
require attention to more subtle cues. Compared to
malevolent power, benevolent power implies con-
cealed intentions. From the perceiver’s point of
view, whereas in malevolent power behaviors the
causal relation between intention and action is clear
and straightforward, for benevolent power behav-
iors, the relation between intention and action may
not be as clear. In order to represent benevolent
power accurately, both the particular cues to social
power and the agent’s choice to use their power for
a benevolent purpose need to be understood. More-
over, in benevolent power, the agent’s power comes
from a capacity to act (e.g., the capacity to take all
resources) as opposed to the action itself (e.g., tak-
ing all of the resources); however, this capacity is
not enacted (e.g., the agent shares resources
evenly). Thus, descriptions of a powerful individ-
ual’s benevolent acts may not include as many cues
to social power as do seemingly malevolent acts,
and therefore benevolent displays of power may be
more difficult for children to understand.
There are alternative factors that might explain
our findings that understanding of malevolent
power occurs earlier than understanding of benevo-
lent power. As mentioned previously, because neg-
ative information is more salient and privileged in
human thought (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999;
Hamlin et al., 2010; Vaish et al., 2008), participants
may have conceptualized malevolent power more
readily than benevolent power. Additionally,
because negative information is attended to more,
malevolent vignettes may have led to deeper pro-
cessing on the task, than benevolent vignettes.
Limitations and Future Directions
We had predicted that evolutionary prepared-
ness for recognizing social power paired with chil-
dren’s early experiences with different types of
social relationships would lead to specific develop-
mental patterns across the five dimensions.
Although our findings support this theoretical pre-
diction, the design of our study does not allow for
a separate examination of the differential contribu-
tions of these factors to children’s conceptions of
social power.
In the studies described here, we examined chil-
dren’s and adults’ concepts of social power across
five distinct dimensions. Adults’ evaluations of how
relevant each vignette was to the different dimen-
sions and the varying developmental patterns we
found suggest that these dimensions capture a wide
range of ways in which power might be conceptu-
alized. However, these studies do not permit strong
conclusions regarding the distinctiveness of the
dimensions. Nonetheless, the main purpose of these
studies was to capture concepts of social power
across a range of possible instantiations. Future
efforts are needed to map out a set of distinct and
exclusive power dimensions.
Despite these limitations, the present studies
demonstrate that children have an early-emerging
and complex understanding of social power across
various possible manifestations. Our findings open
up several intriguing questions for future research
examining children’s conceptualization of social
power both at the individual and group level. As a
first step in studying power concepts, we studied a
predominantly middle-class U.S. sample. Data for
the studies were collected in a children’s museum
in a college town, where many child participants
likely came from highly educated and egalitarian
families. Factors such as family size and structure
may influence the developmental trajectory of
power concepts, as they may relate to the preva-
lence of different types of social interactions in chil-
dren’s early experiences. For example, a child
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growing up in a household with clearly defined
gender- or age-based hierarchies might be sensitive
to power differentials early on, compared to a child
growing up in a more egalitarian household. In
future research, it will be important to consider the
role of demographic characteristics such as racial,
ethnic, or religious background, family structure,
and family size. Additionally, the larger cultural
context that children grow up in will likely influ-
ence their ability to recognize social power differen-
tials. For example, children growing up in cultural
contexts where everyday interactions are more
readily marked by social hierarchies (e.g., cultures
where speakers’ relative ages are marked in lan-
guage), might become sensitive to cues to social
power earlier in development. These variables
could be important in both understanding contex-
tual influences on the development of a concept of
social power, and predicting the generalizability of
findings from this study.
Conclusion
Social power relationships are complex, dynamic,
and ubiquitous. Power structures are found univer-
sally in human as well as nonhuman primate soci-
eties, and they constrain relationships both at the
individual and group level. Developing an early
understanding of social power is adaptive, in that it
allows one to build allegiances with the right indi-
viduals or groups in access to resources and oppor-
tunities for reproduction. Recognizing social power
structures early on also allows children to learn
necessary skills to successfully navigate their social
plane. The studies presented here add to the newly
emerging developmental body of literature on how
children develop an understanding of social power,
by showing that young children are sensitive to
several ways in which social power relationships
are manifested.
In a recent discussion, Spelke (2015) suggested
that studies of children’s early-developing concepts
of social power might unveil a new area of study
for cognitive development, a conceptual domain
that she called na€ıve sociology (see also Hirschfeld,
1999). Na€ıve sociology is not only distinct from
na€ıve physics and na€ıve psychology, but also a
domain that develops on top of the latter two,
such that an understanding of social power may
require the understanding of physical laws of
power (e.g., larger is more powerful than smaller),
psychological laws of power (e.g., intentions gov-
ern power), and social laws of power (e.g., roles
within larger social interactions govern power;
Spelke, 2015). The studies presented here are one
of the first steps contributing to our understanding
of children’s conceptualization of the social interac-
tional aspects of power. However, further research
is necessary to better understand whether concep-
tualizing power indeed necessitates the study of a
new domain of knowledge, or whether it can be
understood as part of other cognitive capacities.
By better understanding the ways in which chil-
dren acquire knowledge about power relationships
(e.g., innate preparedness, learning, foundational
theories), we might be able to answer these big
questions.
References
Atkisson, C., O’Brien, M. J., & Mesoudi, A. (2012). Adult
learners in a novel environment use prestige-biased
social learning. Evolutionary psychology, 10, 519–537.
doi:10.1177/147470491201000309
Brey, E., & Shutts, K. (2015). Children use nonverbal cues
to make inferences about social power. Child Develop-
ment, 86, 276–286. doi:10.1111/cdev.12334
Brownell, C. A., Iesue, S. S., Nichols, S. R., & Svetlova,
M. (2013). Mine or yours? Development of sharing in
toddlers in relation to ownership understanding. Child
Development, 84, 906–920. doi:10.1111/cdev.12009
Cacioppo, J. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1999). The affect sys-
tem architecture and operating characteristics. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 133–137. doi:10.
1111/1467-8721.00031
Charafeddine, R., Mercier, H., Clement, F., Kaufmann, L.,
Berchtold, A., Reboul, A., & Van der Henst, J. B. (2014).
How preschoolers use cues of dominance to make
sense of their social environment. Journal of Cognition
and Development, 16, 587–607. doi:10.1080/
15248372.2014.926269
Chiao, J. Y., Adams, R. B., Peter, U. T., Lowenthal, W. T.,
Richeson, J. A., & Ambady, N. (2008). Knowing who’s
boss: fMRI and ERP investigations of social dominance
perception. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11,
201–214. doi:10.1177/1368430207088038
Chudek, M., Heller, S., Birch, S., & Henrich, J. (2012).
Prestige-biased cultural learning: Bystander’s differen-
tial attention to potential models influences children’s
learning. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 46–56.
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.05.005
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations
for social exchange. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J.
Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology
and the generation of culture (pp. 163–228). New York,
NY: Oxford University Press.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2008). Can a general deontic
logic capture the facts of human moral reasoning? How
the mind interprets social exchange rules and detects
cheaters. In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Ed.), Moral psychol-
ogy (pp. 53–119). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Developing Concepts of Power 961
Cummins, D. D. (1996a). Evidence of deontic reasoning in
3-and 4-year-old children. Memory & Cognition, 24, 823–
829. doi:10.3758/BF03201105
Cummins, D. D. (1996b). Dominance hierarchies and the
evolution of human reasoning. Minds and Machines, 6,
463–480. doi:10.1007/BF00389654
Dack, L. A., & Astington, J. W. (2011). Deontic and epis-
temic reasoning in children. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 110, 94–114. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2011.04.003
De Waal, F. (2007). Chimpanzee politics: Power and sex
among apes. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Depret, E., & Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and
power: Some cognitive consequences of social structure
as a source of control deprivation. In G. Weary, F. Gle-
icher, & K. L. Marsh (Eds.), Control motivation and social
cognition (pp. 176–202). New York, NY: Springer.
doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-8309-3_7
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact
of power on stereotyping. American Psychologist, 48,
621–628. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.48.6.621
Guinote, A., & Vescio, T. K. (Eds.) (2010). The social psy-
chology of power. New York, NY: Guilford.
Hall, J. A., Coats, E. J., & LeBeau, L. S. (2005). Nonverbal
behavior and the vertical dimension of social relations:
A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 898–924.
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.131.6.898
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2007). Social evalu-
ation by preverbal infants. Nature, 450, 557–559.
doi:10.1038/nature06288
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., & Bloom, P. (2010). Three-
month-olds show a negativity bias in their social evalu-
ations. Developmental Science, 13, 923–929. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-7687.2010.00951.x
Hawley, P. (1999). The ontogenesis of social dominance:
A strategy-based evolutionary perspective. Developmen-
tal Review, 19, 97–132. doi:10.1006/drev.1998.0470
Hawley, P. H. (2002). Social dominance and prosocial
and coercive strategies of resource control in preschool-
ers. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 26,
167–176. doi:10.1080/01650250042000726
Hawley, P. H. (2003). Strategies of control, aggression,
and morality in preschoolers: An evolutionary perspec-
tive. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 85, 213–
235. doi:10.1016/S0022-0965(03)00073-0
Heyman, G. D. (2009). Children’s reasoning about traits.
Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 37, 105–143.
doi:10.1016/S0065-2407(09)03703-3
Hirschfeld, L. A. (1999). Naive sociology. In R. A. Wilson
& F. Keil (Eds.) The MIT encyclopedia of the cognitive
sciences (pp. 579–580). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kalish, C. W., & Lawson, C. A. (2008). Development of
social category representations: Early appreciation of
roles and deontic relations. Child Development, 79, 577–
593. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01144.x
Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003).
Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Review,
110, 265–284. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265
Kim, J. M. (1998). Korean children’s concepts of adult and
peer authority and moral reasoning. Developmental Psy-
chology, 34, 947. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.34.5.947
King, A. J., Johnson, D. D., & Van Vugt, M. (2009). The
origins and evolution of leadership. Current Biology, 19,
R911–R916. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2009.07.027
Kinzler, K. D., & DeJesus, J. M. (2013). Children’s soci-
olinguistic evaluations of nice foreigners and mean
Americans. Developmental Psychology, 49, 655–664.
doi:10.1037/a0028740
Koenig, M. A., & Harris, P. L. (2005). Preschoolers
mistrust ignorant and inaccurate speakers. Child Devel-
opment, 76, 1261–1277. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.
00849.x
Lane, J. D., Wellman, H. M., & Gelman, S. A. (2013).
Informants’ traits weigh heavily in young chil-
dren’s trust in testimony and in their epistemic infer-
ences. Child Development, 84, 1253–1268. doi:10.1111/
cdev.12029
Laupa, M. (1994). “Who’s in charge?” Preschool chil-
dren’s concepts of authority. Early Childhood Research
Quarterly, 9, 1–17. doi:10.1016/0885-2006(94)90026-4
Li, V., Spitzer, B., & Olson, K. R. (2014). Preschoolers
reduce inequality while favoring individuals with
more. Child development, 85, 1123–1133. doi:10.1111/
cdev.12198
LoBue, V., Nishida, T., Chiong, C., DeLoache, J. S., &
Haidt, J. (2011). When getting something good is bad:
Even three-year-olds react to inequality. Social Develop-
ment, 20, 154–170. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9507.2009.00560.x
Mandler, J. M. (1988). How to build a baby: On the devel-
opment of an accessible representational system. Cogni-
tive Development, 3, 113–136. doi:10.1016/0885-2014(88)
90015-9
Mascaro, O., & Csibra, G. (2012). Representation of stable
social dominance relations by human infants. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 109, 6862–6867. doi:10.1073/
pnas.1113194109
Mascaro, O., & Csibra, G. (2014). Human infants’ learning
of social structures: The case of dominance hierarchy.
Psychological Science, 25, 250–255. doi:10.1177/
0956797613500509
McGuigan, N. (2013). The influence of model status on
the tendency of young children to over-imitate. Journal
of Experimental Child Psychology, 116, 962–969.
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2013.05.004
Melis, A. P., Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Chim-
panzees recruit the best collaborators. Science, 311,
1297–1300. doi:10.1126/science.1123007
Neary, K. R., Friedman, O., & Burnstein, C. L. (2009).
Preschoolers infer ownership from “control of permis-
sion.” Developmental Psychology, 45, 873. doi:10.1037/
a0014088
Noles, N. S., & Gelman, S. A. (2014). You can’t always
want what you get: Children’s intuitions about owner-
ship and desire. Cognitive Development, 31, 59–68.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2014.02.002
962 G€ulg€oz and Gelman
Olson, K. R., & Spelke, E. S. (2008). Foundations of coop-
eration in young children. Cognition, 108, 222–231.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.003
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2009). Priming third-party
ostracism increases affiliative imitation in children.
Developmental Science, 12, F1–F8. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2008.00820.x
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2015). Children infer affiliative
and status relations from watching others imitate. Devel-
opmental Science, 18, 917–925. doi:10.1111/desc.12275
Overbeck, J. R. (2010). Concepts and historical perspectives
on power. In A. Guinote & T. K. Vescio (Eds.), The social
psychology of power (pp. 19–45). New York, NY: Guildford.
Pellegrini, A. D., Van Ryzin, M. J., Roseth, C., Bohn-Get-
tler, C., Dupuis, D., Hickey, M., & Peshkam, A. (2011).
Behavioral and social cognitive processes in preschool
children’s social dominance. Aggressive Behavior, 37,
248–257. doi:10.1002/ab.20385
Pietraszewski, D., & Shaw, A. (2015). Not by strength
alone: Children’s conflict expectations follow the logic
of the asymmetric war of attrition. Human Nature, 26,
44–72. doi:10.1007/s12110-015-9220-0
Rakoczy, H., & Schmidt, M. F. (2013). The early ontogeny
of social norms. Child Development Perspectives, 7, 17–21.
doi:10.1111/cdep.12010
Rakoczy, H., Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2007). “This
way!,” “No! That way!”—3-year- olds know that two
people can have mutually incompatible desires. Cognitive
Development, 22, 47–68. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2006.08.002
Rubin, K. H., Bukowski, W. M., & Parker, J. G. (2006).
Peer interactions, relationships, and groups. In N.
Eisenberg (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (Vol. III,
pp. 619–700). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Russell, B. (2004). Power: A new social analysis. New York,
NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1938)
Schubert, T. W., Waldzus, S., & Seibt, B. (2008). The
embodiment of power and communalism in space and
bodily contact. In G. R. Semin & E. R. Smith (Eds.),
Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective, and neuro-
scientific approaches (pp. 160–183). Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Shaw, A., Li, V., & Olson, K. R. (2012). Children apply prin-
ciples of physical ownership to ideas. Cognitive Science,
36, 1383–1403. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01265.x
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance theory:
An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Silk, J. B. (2007). Social components of fitness in primate
groups. Science, 317, 1347–1351. doi:10.1126/
science.1140734
Smith, C. E., Blake, P. R., & Harris, P. L. (2013). I should
but I won’t: Why young children endorse norms of fair
sharing but do not follow them. PLoS ONE, 8, e59510.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059510
Spelke, E. S. (2015, March). Discussion presented in S.
G€ulg€oz (chair), Developing a concept of social power. Sym-
posium at the Biennial Meeting for Society for Research
in Child Development, Philadelphia, PA.
Thomsen, L., Frankenhuis, W. E., Ingold-Smith, M., &
Carey, S. (2011). Big and mighty: Preverbal infants
mentally represent social dominance. Science, 331, 477–
480. doi:10.1126/science.1199198
Tomasello, M. (2009). Why we cooperate. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Vaish, A., Grossmann, T., & Woodward, A. (2008). Not
all emotions are created equal: The negativity bias in
social-emotional development. Psychological Bulletin,
134, 383–403. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.134.3.383
Wellman, H. M. (2014). Making minds: How theory of mind
develops. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Wellman, H. M., & Gelman, S. A. (1992). Cognitive devel-
opment: Foundational theories of core domains. Annual
Review of Psychology, 43, 337–375. doi:10.1146/an-
nurev.ps.43.020192.002005
Wellman, H. M., & Miller, J. G. (2008). Including deontic
reasoning as fundamental to theory of mind. Human
Development, 51, 105–135. doi:10.1159/000115958
Williamson, R. A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Markman, E. M.
(2008). Prior experiences and perceived efficacy influ-
ence 3-year-olds’ imitation. Developmental Psychology,
44, 275. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.1.275
Wright Cassidy, K., Cosetti, M., Jones, R., Kelton, E.,
Meier Rafal, V., Richman, L., & Stanhaus, H. (2005).
Preschool children’s understanding of conflicting
desires. Journal of Cognition and Development, 6, 427–454.
doi:10.1207/s15327647jcd0603_6
Zmyj, N., Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Daum, M. M.
(2010). The reliability of a model influences 14-month-
olds’ imitation. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,
106, 208–220. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2010.03.002
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in
the online version of this article at the publisher’s
website:
Appendix S1. List of Vignettes Used for Each
Dimension in Studies 1 and 2
Appendix S2. Sample Vignette for Study 2
Appendix S3. Scripts Used for Vignettes in
Study 3, Describing Benevolent Power
Developing Concepts of Power 963
